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FRIEDRICH AUGUST VON HAYEK ranks among
the most eminent of the modern Austrian
economists. Student of Friedrich von Wieser,
protégé and colleague of Ludwig von Mises,
and foremost among an outstanding genera-
tion of Austrian School theorists, Hayek was
perhaps more successful than anyone else in
spreading Austrian ideas throughout the Eng-
lish-speaking world. “When the definitive his-
tory of economic analysis during the 1930s
comes to be written,” said John Hicks in 1967,
“a leading character in the drama will be Pro-
fessor Hayek. . . . [I]t is hardly remembered that
there was a time when the new theories of Hayek were the principal rival
of the new theories of Keynes.”1 Unfortunately, Hayek’s theory of the
business cycle was eventually swept aside by the Keynesian revolution.
Ultimately, however, this work was again recognized when Hayek re-
ceived, along with the Swede Gunnar Myrdal, the 1974 Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economic Science.
LIFE AND WORK
Hayek’s life spanned the twentieth century, and he made his home in
some of the great intellectual communities of the period. Born in 1899 to
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1Sir John Hicks, Critical Essays in Monetary Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1967), p. 203.
a distinguished family of Viennese intellectuals (one grandfather, a stat-
istician, was a friend of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk; the philosopher Lud-
wig Wittgenstein was a second cousin), Hayek attended the University
of Vienna, earning doctorates in 1921 and 1923. Hayek came to the Uni-
versity at age nineteen, just after World War I, when it was one of the
three best places in the world to study economics (the others being
Stockholm and Cambridge). Though he was enrolled as a law student,
his primary interests were economics and psychology, the latter due to
the influence of Mach’s theory of perception on Wieser and Wieser’s
colleague Othmar Spann, and the former stemming from the reformist
ideal of Fabian socialism so typical of Hayek’s generation. 
Like many students of economics then and since, Hayek chose the
subject not for its own sake, but because he wanted to improve social
conditions—the poverty of postwar Vienna serving as a daily reminder
of such a need. Socialism seemed to provide a solution. Then, in 1922,
Mises published his Die Gemeinwirtschaft, later translated as Socialism.
“To none of us young men who read the book when it appeared,” Hayek
recalled, “the world was ever the same again.”2 Socialism, an elaboration
of Mises’s pioneering article from two years before, argued that eco-
nomic calculation requires a market for the means of production; with-
out such a market there is no way to establish the values of those means
and, consequently, no way to find their proper uses in production.
Mises’s devastating attack on central planning converted Hayek to lais-
sez-faire, along with contemporaries like Wilhelm Röpke, Lionel Rob-
bins, and Bertil Ohlin.
It was around this time that Hayek began attending Mises’s famed
Privatseminar. For several years, the Privatseminar was the center of the
economics community in Vienna. Later, Hayek became the first of this
group to leave Vienna; most of the others, along with Mises himself,
were also gone by the start of World War II.
Mises had done earlier work on monetary and banking theory, suc-
cessfully applying the Austrian marginal-utility principle to the value of
money, and then sketching a theory of industrial fluctuations based on
the doctrines of the British Currency School and the ideas of the Swedish
economist Knut Wicksell. Hayek used this last as a starting point for his
own research on fluctuations, explaining the origin of the business cycle in
terms of bank-credit expansion, and its transmission in terms of capital
2F.A. Hayek, “In Honor of Professor Mises,” in idem, The Fortunes of Liberalism,
vol. 4, The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek, Peter G. Klein, ed. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992), p. 133.
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malinvestments. His work in this area eventually earned him an invita-
tion to lecture at the London School of Economics and Political Science
(LSE), and then to occupy its Tooke Chair in Economics and Statistics,
which he accepted in 1931. There he found himself among a vibrant and
exciting group: Robbins, J.R. Hicks, Arnold Plant, Dennis Robertson,
T.E. Gregory, Abba Lerner, Kenneth Boulding, and George Shackle, to
name only the most prominent. Hayek brought his (to them) unfamiliar
views, and gradually, the Austrian theory of the business cycle became
known and accepted. At the LSE, Hayek lectured on Mises’s business-
cycle theory, which he was refining and which, until Keynes’s General
Theory came out in 1936, was rapidly gaining adherents in Britain and
the United States, and was becoming the preferred explanation of the
Depression.
Hayek and Keynes had sparred in the early 1930s in the pages of the
Economic Journal over Keynes’s Treatise on Money. As one of Keynes’s
leading professional adversaries, Hayek was well situated to provide a
full refutation of the General Theory, but he never did. Part of the explana-
tion for this no doubt lies with Keynes’s personal charm and legendary
rhetorical skill, along with Hayek’s general reluctance to engage in di-
rect confrontation with his colleagues. Hayek also considered Keynes an
ally in the fight against wartime inflation and did not want to detract
from that issue. Furthermore, as Hayek later explained, Keynes was
constantly changing his theoretical framework, and Hayek saw no point
in working out a detailed critique of the General Theory, if Keynes might
change his mind again. Hayek thought a better course would be to pro-
duce a fuller elaboration of Böhm-Bawerk’s capital theory, and he began
to devote his energies to this project. Unfortunately, The Pure Theory of
Capital was not completed until 1941, and by then the Keynesian macro
model had become firmly established. 3
Within a very few years, the fortunes of the Austrian School suffered
a dramatic reversal. First, the Austrian theory of capital, an integral
part of the business-cycle theory, came under attack from Italian-born
3Hayek also believed that an effective refutation of Keynes would have to begin
with a thorough critique of aggregate, or “macro” economics more generally. See
F.A. Hayek, “The Economics of the 1930s as Seen from London,” in idem, Contra
Keynes and Cambridge: Essays, Correspondence, vol. 9, The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek,
Bruce Caldwell, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 49–73. Brian
McCormick and Mark Blaug propose an entirely different reason: Hayek couldn’t
respond because the Austrian capital theory, on which the cycle theory was built,
was simply wrong. See Brian J. McCormick, Hayek and the Keynesian Avalanche (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 99–134; and Mark Blaug, “Hayek Revisited,”
Critical Review 7, no. 1 (1993): 51–60.
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Cambridge economist Piero Sraffa and American Frank Knight, while
the cycle theory itself was forgotten amid the enthusiasm for the General
Theory. Second, beginning with Hayek’s move to London and continu-
ing until the early 1940s, the Austrian economists left Vienna, for per-
sonal and then for political reasons, so that a school ceased to exist there
as such.4 Mises left Vienna in 1934 for Geneva and then New York, where
he continued to work in isolation; Hayek remained at the LSE until 1950,
when he joined the Committee on Social Thought at the University of
Chicago. Other Austrians of Hayek’s generation became prominent in
the United States—Gottfried Haberler at Harvard, Fritz Machlup and
Oskar Morgenstern at Princeton, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan at MIT—but
their work no longer seemed to show distinct traces of the tradition
founded by Carl Menger.
At Chicago, Hayek again found himself among a dazzling group:
the economics department, led by Knight, Milton Friedman, and later
George Stigler, was one of the best anywhere, and Aaron Director at the
law school soon set up the first law-and-economics program.5 But eco-
nomic theory, in particular its style of reasoning, was rapidly changing:
Paul Samuelson’s Foundations had appeared in 1947, establishing phys-
ics as the science for economics to imitate, and Friedman’s 1953 essay on
“positive economics” set a new standard for economic method. In addi-
tion, Hayek had ceased to work on economic theory, concentrating in-
stead on psychology, philosophy, and politics. Austrian economics
entered a prolonged eclipse. Important work in the Austrian tradition
was done during this period by Rothbard, Kirzner, and Lachmann, but,
at least publicly, the Austrian tradition lay mostly dormant.
When the 1974 Nobel Prize in economics went to Hayek, interest in
the Austrian School was suddenly and unexpectedly revived. While this
was not the first event of the so-called Austrian revival, the memorable
South Royalton conference having taken place earlier the same year, the
rediscovery of Hayek by the economics profession was nonetheless a deci-
sive event in the renaissance of Austrian economics.6 Hayek’s writings
4See Earlene Craver, “The Emigration of the Austrian Economists,” History of
Political Economy 18, no. 1 (1986): 1–32.
5However, at Chicago, Hayek was considered something of an outsider; his post
was with the Committee on Social Thought, not the economics department, and his
salary was paid by a private foundation, the William Volker Fund (the same organi-
zation that paid Mises’s salary as a visiting professor at New York University).
6The proceedings of the South Royalton conference were published as The Foun-
dations of Modern Austrian Economics, Edwin G. Dolan, ed. (Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, 1976).
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were taught to new generations, and Hayek himself appeared at the
early Institute for Humane Studies conferences in the mid-1970s. He
continued to write, producing The Fatal Conceit in 1988, at the age of 89.7
Hayek died in 1992 in Freiburg, Germany, where he had lived since
leaving Chicago in 1961.8
Hayek’s legacy in economics is complex. Among mainstream
economists, he is mainly known for his popular The Road to Serfdom9 and
for his work on knowledge in the 1930s and 1940s. Specialists in busi-
ness-cycle theory recognize his early work on industrial fluctuations,
and modern information theorists often acknowledge Hayek’s work on
prices as signals, although his conclusions are typically disputed.
Hayek’s work is also known in political philosophy, legal theory, and
psychology.
Within the Austrian School of economics, Hayek’s influence, while
undeniably immense, has very recently become the subject of some con-
troversy. His emphasis on spontaneous order and his work on complex
systems have been widely influential among many Austrians. Others
have preferred to stress Hayek’s work in technical economics, particu-
larly on capital and the business cycle, citing a tension between some of
Hayek’s and Mises’s views on the social order. (While Mises was a ra-
tionalist and a utilitarian, Hayek focused on the limits to reason, basing
his defense of capitalism on its ability to use limited knowledge and
learning by trial and error.)
BUSINESS-CYCLE THEORY
Hayek’s writings on capital, money, and the business cycle are generally
regarded as his most important contributions to economics. Building on
Mises’s Theory of Money and Credit,10 Hayek showed how fluctuations in
economy-wide output and employment are related to the economy’s
capital structure. In Prices and Production,11 he introduced the famous
“Hayekian triangles” to illustrate the relationship between the value of
7F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, vol. 1, The Collected Works of
F.A. Hayek, W.W. Bartley III, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
8For a fuller biographical account, see F.A. Hayek, Hayek on Hayek: An Autobio-
graphical Dialogue, Stephen Kresge and Leif Wenar, eds. (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1994).
9F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944).
10Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit, H.E. Batson, trans. (Indian-
apolis, Ind.: Liberty Classics, [1912] 1980).
11F.A. Hayek, Prices and Production (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, [1931]
1935).
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capital goods and their place in the temporal sequence of production.
Because production takes time, factors of production must be commit-
ted in the present for making final goods that will have value only in the
future after they are sold. However, capital is heterogeneous; as capital
goods are used in particular production processes, they become increas-
ingly specific to those processes, so they cannot be easily redeployed as
demands for final goods change. The central macroeconomic problem in
a modern capital-using economy is, thus, one of intertemporal coordi-
nation: how can the allocation of resources between capital and con-
sumer goods be aligned with consumers’ preferences between present
and future consumption? In The Pure Theory of Capital,12 perhaps his
most ambitious work, Hayek describes how the economy’s structure of
production depends on the characteristics of capital goods—durability,
complementarity, substitutability, specificity, and so on. This structure
can be described by the various “investment periods” of inputs, an ex-
tension of Böhm-Bawerk’s notion of “roundaboutness,” the degree to
which production takes up resources over time.13
In Prices and Production and Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle,14
Hayek showed how monetary injections, by lowering the rate of interest
below what Mises (following Wicksell) called its “natural rate,” distort
the economy’s intertemporal structure of production.15 Most theories of
the effects of money on prices and output (then and since) consider
only the effects of the total money supply on the price level and aggre-
gate output or investment. The Austrian theory, as developed by
Mises and Hayek, focuses on the way money enters the economy (“in-
jection effects”), and how this affects relative prices and investment in
particular sectors. In Hayek’s framework, investments in some stages of
production are “malinvestments” if they do not help to align the struc-
ture of production to consumers’ intertemporal preferences. The reduc-
tion in interest rates caused by credit expansion directs resources toward
12F.A. Hayek, The Pure Theory of Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1941).
13Hayek ultimately rejected Böhm-Bawerk’s “average period of production” as a
useful concept, though Hayek had used it earlier in Prices and Production. See Hayek,
Hayek on Hayek, p. 141.
14F.A. Hayek, Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, N. Kaldor and H.M. Croome,
trans. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1933).
15Hayek thought the more important case was when the market interest rate was
kept constant despite a rise in the natural interest rate. In his writings, however, he
focused on the expositionally easier case when credit expansion lowers the market
interest rate below an unchanged natural rate.
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capital-intensive processes and early stages of production (whose in-
vestment demands are more interest-rate elastic), thus “lengthening”
the period of production. If interest rates had fallen because consumers
had changed their preferences to favor future over present consump-
tion, then the longer time structure of production would have been an
appropriate, coordinating response. A fall in interest rates caused by
credit expansion, however, would have been a “false signal,” causing
changes in the structure of production that do not accord with consum-
ers’ intertemporal preferences.16 The boom generated by the increase in
investment is artificial. Eventually, market participants come to realize
that there are not enough savings to complete all the new projects; the
boom becomes a bust as these malinvestments are discovered and liqui-
dated.17 Every artificial boom induced by credit expansion, then, is self-
reversing. Recovery consists of liquidating the malinvestments induced
by the lowering of interest rates below their natural levels, thus restoring
the time structure of production so that it accords with consumers’ in-
tertemporal preferences.
KNOWLEDGE, PRICES, AND COMPETITION
AS A DISCOVERY PROCEDURE
Hayek’s writings on dispersed knowledge and spontaneous order are
also widely known, but more controversial. In “Economics and Knowl-
edge”18 and “The Use of Knowledge in Society,”19 Hayek argued that the
central economic problem facing society is not, as is commonly ex-
pressed in textbooks, the allocation of given resources among compet-
ing ends.
16For most of his career, Hayek viewed a system of fractional-reserve banking as
inherently unstable, endorsing a role (in principle) for government stabilization of
the money supply. In later writings, beginning with The Constitution of Liberty (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), and culminating in Denationalization of
Money: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of Concurrent Currencies (London: Insti-
tute of Economic Affairs, 1976), he argued in favor of competition among private
issuers of fiat money.
17Anticipating modern cycle theories Hayek recognized that the behavior of the
cycle depends on expectations about future price and interest-rate movements. But
Hayek did not believe agents could know the real structure of the economy, to cor-
rectly distinguish movements in interest rates generated by changes in consumers’
intertemporal preferences from those generated by changes in the money supply.
See F.A. Hayek, “Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances, and Malinvestments,”
in idem, Profits, Interest, and Investment (London: Routledge, 1939).
18F.A. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge,” Economica 4 (1937): 33–54.
19F.A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35
(September 1945): 519–30.
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It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known
to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance
only those individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the
utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality.20
Much of the knowledge necessary for running the economic system,
Hayek contended, is in the form not of “scientific” or technical knowl-
edge—the conscious awareness of the rules governing natural and so-
cial phenomena—but of “tacit” knowledge, the idiosyncratic, dispersed
bits of understanding of “circumstances of time and place.” This tacit
knowledge is often not consciously known even to those who possess it,
and can never be communicated to a central authority. The market tends
to use this tacit knowledge through a type of “discovery procedure”21 by
which this information is unknowingly transmitted throughout the
economy as an unintended consequence of individuals pursuing their
own ends.22 Indeed, Hayek’s distinction between the neoclassical notion
of “competition,” identified as a set of equilibrium conditions (number
of market participants, characteristics of the product, and so on), and the
older notion of competition as a rivalrous process, has been widely in-
fluential in Austrian economics.23
For Hayek, market competition generates a particular kind of order
—an order that is the product “of human action but not of human de-
sign” (a phrase Hayek borrowed from Adam Ferguson). This “sponta-
neous order” is a system that comes about through the independent
actions of many individuals, and produces overall benefits unintended
and mostly unforeseen by those whose actions bring it about. To distin-
guish between this kind of order and that of a deliberate, planned sys-
tem, Hayek used the Greek terms cosmos for a spontaneous order, and
20Ibid., p. 520.
21F.A. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” in idem, New Studies in
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp.
179–90.
22Hayek’s use of an argument from ignorance as a defense of the market is un-
usual. Modern economists typically require assumptions of hyperrationality—com-
plete and perfect information, rational expectations, perfect markets, and so on—to
justify market allocations as “efficient.” In the new microeconomics literature on
information and incentives, theorists like Joseph Stiglitz have used deviations from
these assumptions of perfection to reach a verdict of market failure and to provide a
rationale for government intervention. For Hayek, by contrast, the fact that agents
are not hyperrational is an argument not against individual freedom, but against
state planning and social control.
23F.A. Hayek, “The Meaning of Competition,” in idem, Individualism and Eco-
nomic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 92–106.
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taxis for a consciously planned one.24 Examples of a cosmos include the
market system as a whole, money, the common law, and even language.
A taxis, by contrast, is a designed or constructed organization, like a firm
or bureau; these are the “islands of conscious power in [the] ocean of
unconscious cooperation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of
buttermilk.”25
Most commentators view Hayek’s work on knowledge, discovery,
and competition as an outgrowth of his participation in the socialist
calculation debate of the 1920s and 1930s. The socialists erred, in
Hayek’s view, in failing to see that the economy as a whole is necessarily
a spontaneous order and can never be deliberately made over in the way
that the operators of a planned order can exercise control over their
organization. This is because planned orders can handle only problems
of strictly limited complexity. Spontaneous orders, by contrast, tend to
evolve through a process of natural selection, and therefore do not need
to be designed or even understood by a single mind.
HAYEK AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS
Clearly, the Austrian revival owes much to Hayek. But are Hayek’s writ-
ings really “Austrian economics”—part of a separate, recognizable tra-
dition—or should we regard them, instead, as an original, deeply personal,
contribution?26 Some observers charge that Hayek’s later work, particu-
larly after he began to turn away from technical economics, shows more
influence of Karl Popper than of Menger or Mises: one critic speaks of
“Hayek I” and “Hayek II”; another writes on “Hayek’s Transformation.”27
24F.A. Hayek, “The Confusion of Language in Political Thought,” in idem, New
Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, pp. 71–97. Earlier, Hayek had used “or-
ganism” and “organization,” borrowed from Mises, to distinguish the two; this is
the distinction cited by Ronald Coase in his famous 1937 article, “The Nature of the
Firm,” Economica N.S., 4 (1937): 386–405. See F.A. Hayek, “The Trend of Economic
Thinking,” in idem, The Trend of Economic Thinking, vol. 3, The Collected Works of F.A.
Hayek, W.W. Bartley, III, and Stephen Kresge, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991), pp. 17–34.
25D.H. Robertson, quoted in Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” p. 35.
26Wieser’s have generally been considered a personal contribution, by Hayek
himself and others.
27For Hayeks I and II, see T.W. Hutchison, “Austrians on Philosophy and Method
(since Menger),” in idem, The Politics and Philosophy of Economics: Marxians, Keynesi-
ans, and Austrians (New York and London: New York University Press, 1984), pp.
203–32; for the “transformation,” see Bruce J. Caldwell, “Hayek’s Transformation,"
History of Political Economy 20 (Winter 1988): 513–41.
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It is true that Popper had a significant impact on Hayek’s mature
thought. Of greater interest is the precise nature of Hayek’s relationship
with Mises. Undoubtedly, no economist had a greater impact on
Hayek’s thinking than Mises—not even Wieser, from whom Hayek
learned his craft, but who died in 1927 when Hayek was still a young
man. In addition, Mises clearly considered Hayek the brightest of his
generation.28 Yet, as Hayek noted, he was from the beginning always
something less than a pure follower:
Although I do owe [Mises] a decisive stimulus at a crucial point of my
intellectual development, and continuous inspiration through a dec-
ade, I have perhaps most profited from his teaching because I was not
initially his student at the university, an innocent young man who took
his word for gospel, but came to him as a trained economist, versed in a
parallel branch of Austrian economics [the Wieser branch] from which
he gradually, but never completely, won me over.29
Much has been written on Hayek’s and Mises’s views on the social-
ist calculation debate.30 The issue is whether a socialist economy is “im-
possible,” as Mises charged in 1920, or simply less efficient or more
difficult to implement. Hayek maintained later that Mises’s “central the-
sis was not, as it is sometimes misleadingly put, that socialism is impos-
sible, but that it cannot achieve an efficient utilization of resources.”31
That interpretation is itself subject to dispute. Hayek is arguing here
against the standard view on economic calculation, found for instance in
Schumpeter.32 This view holds that Mises’s original statement of the
impossibility of economic calculation under socialism was refuted by
Oskar Lange, Fred Taylor, and Abba Lerner, and that later modifications
by Hayek and Robbins amounted to an admission that a socialist econ-
omy is possible in theory but difficult in practice because knowledge is
decentralized and incentives are weak. Hayek’s response in the cited
text, that Mises’s actual position has been exaggerated, receives support
28Margit von Mises, in My Years with Ludwig von Mises, 2nd enlarged ed. (Cedar
Falls, Iowa: Center for Futures Education, 1984), p. 133, recalls of her husband’s
seminar in New York that “Lu met every new student hopeful that one of them
might develop into a second Hayek.”
29F.A. Hayek, “Coping with Ignorance,” Imprimis 7, no. 7 (July 1978): 1–6.
30Hayek’s writings on socialist economic calculation are collected in F.A. Hayek,
Socialism and War: Essays, Documents, Reviews, vol. 10, The Collected Works of F.A.
Hayek, Bruce Caldwell, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
31Hayek, The Fortunes of Liberalism, p. 127.
32Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper
and Row, 1942), pp. 172–86.
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from the primary revisionist historian of the calculation debate, Don
Lavoie, who states that the
central arguments advanced by Hayek and Robbins did not constitute
a “retreat” from Mises, but rather a clarification directing the challenge
to the later versions of central planning. . . . Although comments by
both Hayek and Robbins about computational difficulties of the [later
approaches] were responsible for misleading interpretations of their
arguments, in fact their main contributions were fully consistent with
Mises’s challenge.33
Israel Kirzner similarly contends that Mises’s and Hayek’s positions
should be viewed together as an early attempt to elaborate the Austrian
“entrepreneurial-discovery” view of the market process.34 Joseph
Salerno argues, by contrast, in favor of the traditional view—that
Mises’s original calculation problem is different from the discovery-
process problem emphasized by Lavoie and Kirzner.35
Furthermore, Hayek’s later emphasis on group selection and spon-
taneous order is not shared by Mises, although there are elements of this
line of thought in Menger. A clue to this difference is in Hayek’s state-
ment that “Mises himself was still much more a child of the rationalist
tradition of the Enlightenment and of continental, rather than of Eng-
lish, liberalism . . . than I am myself.”36 This is a reference to the “two
types of liberalism” to which Hayek frequently refers: the continental
rationalist or utilitarian tradition, which emphasizes reason and man’s
ability to shape his surroundings, and the English common-law tradi-
tion, which stresses the limits to reason and the “spontaneous” forces of
evolution.37
Recently, the relationship between Mises and Hayek has become a
full-fledged “dehomogenization” debate, with some seeing Hayek’s
emphasis on knowledge and discovery as substantially different from
Mises’s emphasis on purposeful human action. Indeed, it has been ar-
gued that there are two strands of modern Austrian economics, both
33Don Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Recon-
sidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 20.
34Israel M. Kirzner, “The Socialist Calculation Debate: Lessons for Austrians,”
Review of Austrian Economics 2 (1988): 1–18.
35Joseph T. Salerno, “Ludwig von Mises as Social Rationalist,” Review of Austrian
Economics 4 (1990): 26–54.
36Hayek, “Coping with Ignorance.”
37For more on the complex and subtle Mises–Hayek relationship, see Peter G.
Klein, “Introduction” to Hayek, The Fortunes of Liberalism.
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descended from Menger. One, the Wieser–Hayek strand, focuses on dis-
persed knowledge and the price system as a device for communicating
knowledge. Another, the Böhm-Bawerk–Mises strand, focuses on
monetary calculation (or “appraisal,” meaning anticipation of future
prices) based on existing money prices. Thus, the dispute is whether the
differences between Hayek and Mises are primarily matters of emphasis
and language or matters of substance.38
Regardless, there is widespread agreement that Hayek ranks among
the greatest members of the Austrian School, and among the leading
economists of the twentieth century. His work continues to be influential
in business-cycle theory, comparative economic systems, political and
social philosophy, legal theory, and even cognitive psychology. Hayek’s
writings are not always easy to follow—he describes himself as “puz-
zler” or “muddler” rather than a “master of his subject”—and this may
have contributed to the variety of interpretations his work has aroused.39
Partly for this reason, Hayek remains one of the most intriguing intellectual
figures of our time.
38See, for example, Joseph T. Salerno, “Mises and Hayek Dehomogenized,” Re-
view of Austrian Economics 6, no. 2 (1993): 113–46; and Leland B. Yeager, “Mises and
Hayek on Calculation and Knowledge,” Review of Austrian Economics 7, no. 2 (1994):
93–109. Rothbard identifies three distinctive and often clashing paradigms within
Austrian economics:
Misesian praxeology, the Hayek–Kirzner emphasis on the market as trans-
mission of knowledge and coordination of plans—rather than the Misesian
emphasis on continuing coordination of prices, and the ultra-subjectivism
of [Ludwig] Lachmann.
Review of Bruce Caldwell and Stephan Boehm, eds., “Austrian Economics: Ten-
sions and New Directions,” Southern Economic Journal 61, no. 2 (October 1994):
559–60. For a contrary view, see Kirzner’s review of Jack Birner and Rudy Van Zijp,
“Hayek, Co-ordination, and Evolution,” Southern Economic Journal 61, no. 4 (April
1995): 1243–44:
To fail to see the common economic understanding shared by Mises and
Hayek, is to have been needlessly misled by superficial differences in expo-
sition and emphasis. To compound this failure by perceiving a clash, among
modern Austrians, of “Hayekians” versus “Misesians,” is to convert an
interpretive failure into a dogmengeschictliche nightmare.
39Along with himself, Hayek named Wieser and Frank Knight as representative
puzzlers, and Böhm-Bawerk, Joseph Schumpeter, and Jacob Viner as representative
masters of their subjects. As Hayek recalled,
I owed whatever worthwhile new ideas I ever had to not being able to
remember what every competent specialist is supposed to have at his finger-
tips. Whenever I saw a new light on something, it was as the result of a
painful effort to reconstruct an argument which most competent economists
would effortlessly and instantly reproduce.
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